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Abstract:
In digital forensics, maintaining the integrity of digital exhibits is an essential aspect of the entire investigation and examination
process, which is established using the technique of hashing. Lack of knowledge, while handling digital exhibits, might lead to
unintentional alteration of computed hash, rendering the exhibit unacceptable in the court of Law. The hash value of a physical
drive does not solely depend upon the data files present in it but also its file-system. Therefore, any change to the file-system
might result in the change of the disk hash, even when the data files within it remain untouched. In this paper, our objective
is to study the role of file-system in modification of the hash value. We examine and analyse the changes in the file-system of a
NTFS formatted USB storage device, which leads to modification in its hash value when the device is plugged-in to the computer
system without using write-blocker. The outcome of this research would justify the importance of write blockers while handling
digital exhibits and also substantiate that the alteration in hash value of a storage device might not be an indication that data
within the device has been tampered with.

Introduction
The initial phase of digital forensics examination starts with the acquisition of data from digital
exhibits such as hard disks, USB storage devices etc. seized from the crime scene (Hosmer, 2002).
This is done by creating a forensically sound copy of the storage media, which in turn, is achieved by
creating a bit-stream image of it (Carlton, 2007). The essence, however, is to preserve the integrity of
the exhibit and maintain a strict chain of custody (Kent et al., 2006; Kissel, 2013). As per (Vanstone
et al., 1997) and the guidelines of the National Institute of Standards and Technologies (Kissel, 2013),
Integrity of digital exhibits is defined as “the property whereby data within the exhibit has not been
altered or modified in an unauthorized manner since the time it was created, transmitted or stored
by an authorized source”, and is represented as hash value. To maintain integrity, forensic examiners
use write-blocker to perform the imaging process, so as to prevent any unintentional changes to it by
either the workstation or the operating system (Henry, 2009; Nelson et al., 2013).
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With the advent of NTFS file-system, it has become the basis of pre-dominant operating systems
in use, such as Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, 8.1 and Windows 10 (Newsham et.
Al, 2007; Purcell & Lang, 2008; Svensson, 2005). Uniqueness of NTFS is its utilization of a journaling
file system (NTFS, 1999), as a result of which, it keeps a record of all the changes taking place in a
storage device or computer system by using a journal. This is done through MFT, which keeps data
records of itself using metadata files (Rusbarsky & City, 2012). Metadata files are the files that describe
the file-system and are instrumental in identifying whether an action is human or computer-oriented,
thus revealing information about the creation, ownership, history, etc. of digital exhibits attached to
the computer (Wee, 2006). Research (Kessler & Carlton, 2014) has been conducted for testing the
scientific reason behind the requirement to use write-blockers during the acquisition of data from
digital exhibits, especially in the case of NTFS formatted storage devices. Experiments have proved
that the hash value of the storage device does get altered when no write-blocker is used. However, no
literature or research experiment has provided a scientific explanation behind the alteration of the
hash value of NTFS-formatted storage devices.
This research is undertaken with the objective of determining the role, the file-system plays in
the modification of the hash value of a digital exhibit. In this direction, we try to establish the technical
and scientific purpose behind the alteration of a hash value of any NTFS-formatted storage device even
without any addition or deletion of data, when plugged in to a computer system in the absence of a
write-blocker. To achieve this, an NTFS-formatted USB thumb drive is used in a Windows operating
system. The thumb drive is plugged in and out of the computer system without using a write-blocker
and the hash value is recorded through imaging by using a write-blocker. The process is repeated
multiple times without any intentional addition or deletion of data to the disk. The MFT records from
the images of the thumb drive in each instance are examined, analysed and compared using various
tools and techniques to determine the changes taking place, which in turn lead to the variation in its
hash value each time it is used in the absence of a write-blocker.
Literature Review
In NTFS, every entry is considered a file (Nelson et al., 2013; Rusbarsky, 2012). The first set of
data is known as the Partition Boot Sector, starting at sector [0] and can expand up to 16 sectors. The
Master File Table (MFT) lies immediately after sector [0] and covers around 12.5% of the disk (Nelson
et al., 2013). The data (files and directories) in MFT are stored inside records, where each record is
of the size 1024 bytes. The record fields consist of the metadata about the file or directory and the
file’s data or links to the file’s data, which in turn depends on the size of the file. When the size of the
file is less than 512 bytes, the data of the file along with its metadata is stored in the MFT record,
known as the resident file. However, files larger than 512 bytes are stored outside the MFT, in external
clusters, whose addresses are stored within the MFT records of the file. Such files are referred to as
non-resident files (Svensson, 2005).
The first 15 records in the Master File Table are reserved for the system files, also referred to as
metadata records. The metadata records in the MFT are as follows:
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With the introduction of NTFS, the data storage technique by the operating system on the storage
devices changed significantly (Alazab et al., 2009; Nelson et al., 2013). Not just user-data, but filesystem metadata such as partition tables, MFT, etc. is also present in an NTFS formatted storage
device. These metadata are used in the retrieval of information stored in a device and are usually
managed by the operating system running on the host machine to which the device might be attached
(Lyle, 2006).
Hashing plays a significant role in determining the authenticity and reliability of digital evidences (Cosic & Baca, 2010; Roussev, 2009). Hashing is defined as the technique wherein a fixed-length
alphanumeric string is generated from a variable-sized input through hash algorithms (Kumar et al.,
2012). The alphanumeric string is known as the Hash value or Digest. The hashing process forms the
backbone of every digital forensic investigation. The hash value can be computed for a piece of data
file or even for an entire exhibit such as a Hard Disk, USB devices, etc. The hash value of an exhibit
is subject to change when new data contents are added to it, existing data contents are deleted from
it or altered (Kumar et al., 2012), leading to a compromise in authenticity, reliability and integrity.
International Journal of Cybersecurity Intelligence and Cybercrime, Vol. 3, Iss. 1, Page. 24-41, Publication date: February 2020.
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However, write-blocker plays a pivotal role in maintaining the integrity of a storage device, since the
hash value also changes in its absence (Kessler & Carlton, 2014), even if there are no data addition,
deletion or modification to the exhibit. In such an instance, it is extremely important to determine the
different factors resulting in the change of drive hash value because this type of hash modification can
be a deciding factor in digital forensic investigation.
Experimental Design
The experiment was performed with a USB thumb drive with a 4 GB capacity on a workstation having a 64-bit Windows 10 operating system, 8GB RAM and Intel(R) Core (TM) i7-7700 CPU @
3.60GHz x-64 based processor.
Tools Used
The following tools were used for conducting the experiment:
a. Tableau Forensic USB 3.0 Bridge – Tableau Forensic USB 3.0 Bridge is a hardware writeblocker, used during forensic acquisition (bit-stream imaging) of the USB thumb drive (Homeland Security, 2018).
b. Tableau Forensic Duplicator – Forensic Duplicator is a modular multi-function device,
which is used for both forensic imaging as well as cloning any storage media (Homeland
Security, 2018). In this experiment, the tool was used for performing the wiping operation in
the USB thumb drive.
c. FTK Imager - Forensic Toolkit (FTK) Imager, is a disk-imaging tool used for bit-stream
imaging of a physical drive, logical drive, CD/DVD, or contents of a file and folder (Homeland
Security, 2016).
d. NTFS File Extractor – NTFS File Extractor is a parsing tool, which extracts different files
from the NTFS volume (Schicht, 2014). This tool was used for parsing the bit-stream image
of the USB thumb drive for extraction of various metadata files.
e. Mft2Csv – Mft2Csv is a parser, which is used for the extraction and decoding of $MFT
records information (Schicht, 2014).
f. LogFileParser- LogFileParser is used for parsing the $LogFile found in the NTFS volume
(Schicht, 2014)
g. Hex Editor – Hex Editor is a tool, which is used for viewing and editing the raw contents of
disk drives, as well as to display and edit the memory used by the running processes. In this
research, bit-stream image files with a size larger than 4GB, were analysed and examined
using HxD (Horz, 2019).
Methodology
The following methodology was followed in carrying out the experiment:
1. A 4GB USB thumb drive is taken and wiped using Tableau Forensic Duplicator. It is formatted using NT file system on the workstation before starting the experiment.
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2. A bit-stream raw image (NTFS1.001) of the NTFS formatted thumb drive is captured
using FTK Imager. In this acquisition process, the thumb drive is connected to the workstation via a Tableau Forensic USB 3.0 Bridge (write-blocker). The hash value is noted.
3. Without adding any content to the thumb drive, it is plugged into the computer directly
without using any write-blocker and plugged-out.
4. The imaging process in Step 2 is repeated and another raw image (NTFS2.001) is obtained.
The hash value is again noted.
5. Steps 3 and 2 are repeated respectively, for obtaining a third raw image (NTFS3.001) of
the thumb drive.
6. All the raw images (i.e., NTFS1.001, NTFS2.001, and NTFS3.001) are parsed using the
tool NTFS File Extractor and the metadata files were extracted.
7. The $MFT records, which are obtained from the raw images, are further parsed and decoded using the tool Mft2Csv. The parsed records are analysed and compared.
8. Also, the $LogFile records are parsed using the tool LogFileParser and extracted files are
analysed and compared.
9. The changes taking place in the $MFT and $LogFile, which in turn alter the hash value
of the thumb drive, are compared, analysed and discussed in the next section.
Analysis of Results and Discussion
The plugging-in and plugging out of the NTFS-formatted USB thumb drive into the workstation
without using write blocker, and subsequent imaging and hashing resulted in the following hash values
(MD5 hash algorithm) in each of the instances, as given:

From Table 2, it can be seen that both MD5 and SHA-1 hash values of the thumb drive differ from
one another everytime it was plugged-in and out of the workstation without a write-blocker.
Extraction of Metadata files from NTFS Volume
In order to examine, we analysed and compared the various changes taking place in the filesystem of the storage media from one instance to another. The bit-stream imaging was done by attaching the media to the workstation through a write-blocker. On parsing the images by using NTFS File
Extractor and FTK Imager, the following metadata files were obtained: $Extend, $AttrDef, $BadClus,
$Bitmap, $Boot, $I30, $LogFile, $MFT, $MFTMirr, $Secure, $TXF_DATA, $Upcase, $Volume
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Figure 1. A snapshot of parsed and decoded bit-stream images of the NTFS-formatted USB thumb drive showing various metadata
files present in its file-system, obtained using NTFS File Extractor and FTK Imager

On examining and comparing the obtained metadata files, it was observed that changes took place
only in $MFT, $LogFile and $Extend files, while the rest of the metadata files remained unchanged
in all the three images. To further determine the exact changes occurring in the above-mentioned
metadata files, each of the files were parsed using a different software tool, extracting several other
files from them.
Analysis of $MFT metadata file
The $MFT files obtained from the images of the thumb drive were parsed, decoded and examined. It was observed that the MFT parser decoded the file at the “RecordOffset” level starting from
0x00000000 to 0x00040000 and data at an interval every 400 offsets are read. These 400 offsets consist
of attributes such as “Signature”, “Integrity Check”, “HEADER_MFTRecordNumber”, “FN_Filename”,
“FilePath”, “FileSizeBytes” and many more till “LOGGED_UTILITY_STREAM_ON”. The following file
records for NTFS metadata files were found between RecordOffset 0x00000000 to 0x00009800 (Russinovich et al., 2012):

Figure 2. File Records for the NTFS metadata files along with the Record Offset Number, as parsed and decoded from the $MFT
files

It was also found that only till RecordOffset 0x00009800, the MFT file maintains file record data for a
newly NTFS-formatted USB thumb drive, as shown in Fig. 2.
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On comparing the parsed and decoded output of $MFT files from all the images (NTFS1.001,
NTFS2.001, and NTFS3.001), it was found that there was only a single change in the entire file (i.e.,
in the “Header_LSN” field, where LSN stands for LogFile Sequence Number) (Oh, 2013). LogFile Sequence Number (LSN) is a numerical value, which increases sequentially when there is a change in
the file records for NTFS metadata files. The changes taking place in the field “Header_LSN” were
shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4.

Figure 3. Snapshot showing the comparison of the $MFT metadata file among NTFS1.001 and NTFS2.001

Figure 4. Snapshot showing the comparison of the $MFT metadata file among NTFS2.001 and NTFS3.001
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On examination and analysis of the images NTFS1.001 and NTFS2.001, it was found that at
offset(h) 8008 from block(h) 8008-800F, the value of HEADER_LSN changed from 49 21 40 00 00 00
00 00 to 95 2E 40 00 00 00 00 00 (in Little endian format). The values were converted to Big Endian
format and then to decimal format, which showed that the value of HEADER_LSN from “4202825” to
“4206229”. Similarly, the value changes from “4206229” to “4206999” when the $MFT files of images
NTFS2.001 and NTFS3.001 were compared, examined, and analysed, as shown in Table 3.

Analysis of $LogFile Metadata File
The $LogFile metadata files obtained from the images of the thumb drive were parsed, decoded,
and examined, resulting in the extraction of 31 different files. In the analysis and comparison of the
files, it was observed that only 19 files showed changed value of attributes from one image to another,
as shown in Table 4.

The following changes were observed in different files extracted from the parsed $LogFile:
Comparative analysis of LogFile_AllTransactionalHeaders.csv.. LogFile_AllTransactionHeaders.csv is involved in logging the records concerning “Redo pass” and “Undo pass” in the thumb
drive. During “Redo pass”, NTFS redoes the “page update” records consisting of modifications to the
volume (i.e., USB thumb drive) from the cache and flushes it to the disk. On the other hand, during
“Undo pass”, non-committed transactions are rolled back to bring the system to a consistent state
(www.cs.stju.edu.cn).
International Journal of Cybersecurity Intelligence and Cybercrime, Vol. 3, Iss. 1, Page. 24-41, Publication date: February 2020.
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On analysis and subsequent comparison of LogFile.csv in all the three image files, records were
logged, as shown in Table 5.

The comparative analysis shown in Table 5 is graphically represented in Fig. 5 (See next page).
In the comparison and analysis of the graphs as shown in Fig. 5, the following observations were
made:
• All three image files consist of 347 common records (marked in red color in Fig. 5) from
offset 0x00004040 to 0x00015F38.
• 26 records (shown in blue color in Fig. 5) from offset 0x00002040 to 0x00003590 are logged
only in NTFS1.001 and not logged in NTFS2.001.
• 36 new records (from offset 0x00016040 to 0x00017DF8) are created in continuation to the
existing ones for the image file NTFS2.001, which are not present in NTFS1.001.
• 33 new records (from offsets 0x000025B0 to 0x00002DE0 and 0x00017F68 to 0x00019DE0)
are found for the image file NTFS3.001
International Journal of Cybersecurity Intelligence and Cybercrime, Vol. 3, Iss. 1, Page. 24-41, Publication date: February 2020.
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Figure 5. Comparative analysis of the number of offsets recorded in LogFile_AllHeadersTransactions.csv for the image files
(NTFS1.001, NTFS2.001 and NTFS3.001) shown graphically

• The first record (at offset 0x00002040) in NTFS3.001 is similar to that of NTFS1.001. The
next 5 records (from offsets 0x000025B0 to 0x00002DE0) are new ones, which are not logged
in NTFS1.001 or NTFS2.001.
• Also, the last 27 records (from offset 0x00017F68 to 0x00019DE0) are newly logged in
NTFS3.001 only.
On the basis of the differences found in the number of record offsets (as shown in Table 5), the existing “Redo/Undo operation” records in LogFile_AllTransactionHeaders.csv in NTFS1.001 were compared to the ones of the corresponding LogFile_AllTransactionHeaders.csv extracted from NTFS2.001,
as shown in Table 6.
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From Table 6, it is evident that there are nine records namely “AttributeNamesDump (0x1E),
CompensationLogRecord (0x01), DirtyPageTableDump (0x1F), Noop (0x00), UpdateFileNameRoot (0x13),
UpdateFileNameAllocation (0x14), OpenAttributeTableDump (0x1D), ForgetTransaction (0x1B) and
OpenNonResidentAttribute (0x1C)” pertaining to “Redo/Undo operations” that are changing. The change
in the number of operations from NTFS1.001 to NTFS2.001 results in the variation in the number of
offsets (as mentioned in Table 5. Similar changes are also observed when a comparison is done between
the LogFile_AllTransactionHeaders.csv of NTFS2.001 and NTFS3.001.
Comparative analysis of LogFile.csv. In the analysis and subsequent comparison of LogFile.csv
in all the three image files, changes in logged records and record offsets were found, as shown in Table
7.

The comparative analysis shown in Table 7 is graphically represented in Fig. 6 (See next page).
In the analysis and comparison of the graphs as shown in Fig. 6, the following observations were
noted:
• The LogFile.csv in all three image files consist of 347 common records (i.e., from offset
0x00004040 to 0x00015F38) as marked in red color in Fig. 6.
• The first 26 records (marked in violet color in Fig. 6) logged from offset 0x00002040 till
0x00003590 in NTFS1.001 are different from the first 18 records (marked in blue color)
logged from offset 0x00002058 till 0x00003D58 in NTFS2.001. It is also evident that the
starting offset record in both the image files is different.
International Journal of Cybersecurity Intelligence and Cybercrime, Vol. 3, Iss. 1, Page. 24-41, Publication date: February 2020.

34

The Role of File-system in Modification of Hash Value

Raychaudhuri & Christopher, 2020

Figure 6. Comparative analysis of the number of offsets recorded in LogFile.csv for the image files (NTFS1.001, NTFS2.001 and
NTFS3.001) shown graphically

• In NTFS3.001, the starting record offset is the same as that in NTFS1.001 (offset 0x00002040).
However, the next 7 records (i.e., from offset 0x000025B0 to 0x000030E0) vary as compared
to those of both NTFS1.001 and NTFS2.001
• The last 36 records in NTFS2.001 are also found in NTFS3.001 (marked in yellow color in
Fig. 5) from offset 0x00016040 to 0x00017DF8.
• Image file NTFS3.001 consists of 27 newly logged records (marked in violet color in Fig.
5) from offset 0x00017F68 to 0x00019DE0, which are neither present in NTFS1.001 or
NTFS2.001.
On the basis of the differences found in the number of record offsets (as shown in Table 7),
the logged “Redo/Undo operation” records in LogFile.csv in NTFS1.001 were compared to the ones
of the corresponding LogFile.csv extracted from NTFS2.001. Twenty one operations in 373 offsets (in
NTFS1.001) and 383 offsets (in NTFS2.001) showed a match with those of LogFile_AllTransactionHeaders.csv
(as shown in Table 6). There were an additional 18 “Redo/Undo operations” logged only in LogFile.csv
of NTFS2.001, which were shown in Table 8.
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The 18 Redo/Undo operations, which were logged only in LogFile.csv of NTFS2.001 increases the
number of record offsets to 401 (as shown in Table 7) as compared to 383 offsets in LogFile_AllTransactionHeaders.csv of NTFS2.001, whereas both LogFile.csv and LogFile_AllTransactionalHeaders.csv have
373 record offsets in NTFS1.001 (as shown in Table 5 and 7). Changes in LogFile.csv also resulted in
changes found in LogFile.sql.
Comparative analysis of LogFile_CheckpointRecord.csv. LogFile_CheckpointRecord.csv writes a checkpoint record, which describes the type of processing required to recover the NTFS volume
if a crash occurs immediately. It also denotes the location in the $LogFile to which NTFS must go in
order to start the recovery process (www.cs.sjtu.edu.cn). The CheckpointRecord.csv file in NTFS1.001
consists of data written in four unique offset records. In the comparison to NTFS2.001, it is seen that
new CheckpointRecord data is logged into three more offsets, making a total of seven offsets in the file.
Further, it is also found that in NTFS3.001, another four CheckpointRecord data offsets are added,
making a total of 11 offsets.
Comparative analysis of LogFile_DirtyPageTable64bit.csv. The LogFile_DirtyPageTable64bit.csv maintains the pages in the cache containing modifications to the file-system structure that have
not yet been written to the disk. During recovery, the dirty pages must be flushed to the disk (Russinovich et al., 2012). The DirtyPageTable64bit.csv file in NTFS1.001 consists of two records. In the
comparison to NTFS2.001, it is seen that the new DirtyPageTable64bit contains five record offsets,
giving a difference of three records in the file. Further, it is also found that in NTFS3.001, another
three data offsets are added, making a total of eight records.
Comparative analysis of LogFile_RCRD.csv. LogFile_RCRD.csv denotes the records of the
$LogFile and is found at an interval of every 1000 offsets starting from the offset record 0x00002000.
In the analysis of $LogFile in NTFS1.001, it was seen that the offset records ended at 0x00015000,
while the same ended at 0x00017000 and 0x00019000 for $LogFile in NTFS2.001 and NTFS3.001
respectively, as shown in Fig. 6. Therefore, a comparison among the LogFile_RCRD.csv shows that
data were logged into 2000 new record offsets every time imaging of the thumb drive was done without
using a write-blocker.

Figure 7. A snapshot of the comparative analysis of the record offsets of LogFile_RCRD.csv extracted from parsing $LogFile from
NTFS1.001, NTFS2.001 and NTFS3.001, using Hex Editor
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Comparative analysis of LogFile_INDX_I30.csv. Analysis of LogFile_INDX_I30.csv for NTFS1.001 and in NTFS2.001 shows the addition of one offset record 0x00008928 in the latter. However, in
the comparison of LogFile_INDX_I30.csv in NTFS2.001 and NTFS3.001, the offset record 0x00008928,
which was added in NTFS2.001, could not be found in NTFS3.001.
Comparative analysis of LogFile_UpdateFileName_I30.csv. The file LogFile_UpdateFileName_I30.csv consists of all the decoded UpdateFileNameRoot and UpdateFileNameAllocation for both
redo and undo operations (lib4dev.in). UpdateFileNameRoot and UpdateFileNameAllocation were the
undo and redo operation records, which were contained in the file LogFile_AllTransactionHeaders.csv.
In comparing all three LogFile_UpdateFileName_I30.csv, it was observed that they contained an
equal number of record offsets (i.e., 24 record offsets). While examining and analysing all the parsed
data, it was inferred that out of the 24 record offsets, 12 were redo operations (If_IsRedo Flag set
to 1), while the rest of the records were the corresponding undo operations (If_IsRedo Flag set to
0). In NTFS1.001, the record offsets start from 0x00002098 and end at 0x00015F38. However, on
comparing it to NTFS2.001, it was observed that the record offsets start from 0x00003058 and end at
0x00017058. Record offset 0x00004870 till 0x00015F38 were found to be contained in both NTFS1.001
and NTFS2.001 (i.e., eight offsets are similar in both the disk images, whereas four offsets, which are
logged in NTFS2.001 are not found in the former). Similarly, in NTFS3.001, the same eight records
were found, starting from 0x00004870 and ending at 0x00018868. In the comparison of disk images
NTFS2.001 and NTFS3.001, three more records were found to be matching, (i.e., from offset number
0x00016098 till 0x00017058), while only an extra record offset 0x00018868 was logged in the latter.
Comparative analysis of LogFile_OpenAttributeTable.csv. The file LogFile_OpenAttributeTable.csv in NTFS1.001 consists of 19 unique record offsets starting from 0x00002798 till 0x00014868.
When compared to the corresponding counterpart in NTFS2.001, it was observed that it consisted of
22 unique records starting from offset 0x000040E0 and ending at 0x00017778. On further comparison with that of NTFS3.001, there was a difference of six records. In NTFS3.001, the records start
from the offset 0x00002800 and terminate at 0x00019800. Analysis of LogFile_OpenAttributeTable.csv in all the three bit-stream images revealed that there were 18 record offsets from 0x000040E0
till 0x00014868, which were common in all the images. Although, there was a difference of six offsets
between NTFS2.001 and NTFS3.001, three records (i.e., from 0x00016798 to 0x00016F90) have been
logged in both image files.
Analysis of $Tops metadata file
$Tops is a file present inside the $Extend metadata file, which is a directory consisting of the
extended metadata file. The file is present in the location $Extend $RmMetadata $TxfLog $Tops. TxF
Old Page Streams (TOPS) is a file, which stores data that has been overwritten inside a currently
active transaction (Metz, 2019). The $Tops file was compared to the images NTFS1.001, NTFS2.001,
and NTFS3.001. The value of offset 0x000000020 changed from 01 in NTFS1.001 to 00 in NTFS2.001,
as shown in Fig.8. However, no change was observed in the $Tops file when the image file NTFS2.001
was compared to NTFS3.001.
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Figure 8. A snapshot of the comparison of contents of $Tops file extracted from the parsing of NTFS1.001 and NTFS2.001, using
Hex Editor

Conclusion and Suggestions
During the experiments performed the comparison and analysis of the various metadata files of
NTFS, extracted by parsing and decoding bit-stream images of the USB thumb drive was done. It was
observed that there were significant changes in the file-system. The major changes were found in metadata files namely $MFT, $LogFile and $Tops. In $MFT file, there was a change in the values recorded
for LogFile Sequence Number (LSN). While parsing and decoding $LogFile, 31 files were generated.
Analysis of these 31 files revealed changes in the contents of 12 files namely debug.log, LogFile.csv,
LogFile.sql, LogFile_AllTransactionHeaders.csv, LogFile_DirtyPageTable64bit.csv, LogFile_INDX_I30,
LogFile_OpenAttributeTable.csv, LogFile_RCRD.csv, LogFile_UpdateFileName_I30.csv, LogFile_UpdateFileName_I30.sql, LogFile_ CheckpointRecord.csv, and ntfs.db. Significant modifications were found
to exist in the 12 files parsed from $LogFile. The third metadata file also showed a minute alteration in
the $TOPS (TxF Old Page Streams) file. In $Tops file, the change was observed only when a comparison was done among NTFS1.001 and NTFS2.001, while no change was taking place when NTFS2.001
was compared to NTFS3.001.
Thus, after performing the experiments in this research, it was concluded that the NTFS filesystem plays a major role in changing of hash value of a digital storage device such as the hard disk
drive, USB disks, etc. The hash value of the storage device is liable to get modified even when the
device has been freshly wiped and formatted, and it is used without a write-blocker. The hash value of a
storage device might not always change due to a change in the file contents of the device. This research
portrays the importance and essence of write-blockers during the examination of digital evidence.
Based on the conclusions, the following suggestions are given:
• More significance should be given to the hash value of individual data files contained in an
exhibit rather than that of the entire exhibit, during the course of investigation. The hash
values of all the individual data files present inside the exhibit should strictly be computed
and documented.
• The hash value of the exhibit might get altered accidentally due to the absence of writeblockers during the acquisition or examination phase, whereas the hash value of the indiviInternational Journal of Cybersecurity Intelligence and Cybercrime, Vol. 3, Iss. 1, Page. 24-41, Publication date: February 2020.
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dual data files will remain unaltered. Under such circumstances, it should not be assumed
or interpreted that there is tampering done to the individual files within the exhibit.
• After dispatch of the digital exhibit from the forensic laboratory, later in the courtroom, if
the computed hash value of the exhibit does not match the documented hash value, in such
circumstances, the hash values of the individual files should be matched to check whether
any actual tampering has been done or not.
• Computing the block hash values of the exhibit as compared to the entire exhibit should
be considered as a best practice.
The outcome of this research would be extremely useful and helpful for the forensic fraternity in dealing with the investigation of cyber-crime cases, especially when disk forensics is to be done.
Limitations and Future Scope
This research has been conducted with the objective of determining the changes that take place
inside the NTFS file-system of a storage device, which leads to a change in the hash value of the device
when the storage device is plugged-in and plugged-out of the computer system without making any
addition, deletion or modification of data to it. After performing the experiments on a USB thumb
drive, it was concluded that several changes take place in the Master File Table, which is part of
the NTFS file-system of the device. However, there have been some limitations while carrying out
the research. The scope of our research has given rise to few limitations or constraints, which can be
resolved in the future by carrying out similar studies.
The following are the limitations and future scopes of the study conducted:
a) In this research, our scope is limited to carrying out the experiments on USB thumb
drive with NTFS file-system. However, the same experiment can also be carried out on other
storage devices like Hard Disks, Solid-State Drives (SSDs) etc. with NTFS file-system.
b) Only a single file-system has been considered in this experiment due to its wide and
popular usage in the Windows operating system. In the future, other different file-systems
such as FAT32, Ext, HFS, etc. can also be experimented upon using a similar methodology
and a comparative analysis can be done among the results.
c) The work performed in this study is independent of time factor. The plug-in and plugout time of the storage devices have not been taken into account. However, similar work
can be conducted in the near future with a dependence on time factor to determine if any
pre-dominant changes are there.
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Ann Arbor, MI, ProQuest. Ćosić, J., & Bača, M. (2010, May). (Im) proving chain of custody and
digital evidence integrity with time stamp. In The 33rd International Convention MIPRO (pp.
1226-1230).
International Journal of Cybersecurity Intelligence and Cybercrime, Vol. 3, Iss. 1, Page. 24-41, Publication date: February 2020.

39

The Role of File-system in Modification of Hash Value

Raychaudhuri & Christopher, 2020

Henry, P. (2009). Best practices in digital evidence collection. SANS. Retrieved from https://www.sans
.org/blog/best-practices-in-digital-evidence-collection/
Homeland Security Science and Technology. (2016). FTK Imager v3.4.2.6 - Test Results for Disk Imaging Tool. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications1491_508_Test\%2
0Report\_NIST\_Disk\%20Imaging_FTK\%20Imager\%20v3.4.2.6_October_14_2016.pdf
Homeland Security Science and Technology. Tableau TD3 forensic imager v2.0.0, test results for disk
imaging tool- federated testing suite. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publi
cations/508_Test\%20Report_NIST\%20Disk\%20Imaging\%20Tool\%20Tableau\%20TD3\%
20Forensic\%20Image\%20v2.0.0\%20August\%202018\_Final.pdf
Homeland Security Science and Technology (2018). Tableau Forensics USB 3.0 Bridge T8u , Test Results for Disk Imaging Tool- Federated testing Suite. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/de
fault/files/publications/Test\%20Report_NIST_HWB_Tableau\%20Forensic\%20USB\%203.0
\%20Bridge\%20T8u_Firmware\%20Version\%20Apr\%2026\%202018\%2008.49.42\_Octob
er\%202018.pdf
Hosmer, C. (2002). Proving the integrity of digital evidence with time. International Journal of Digital
Evidence, 1(1), 1-7.
Kent, K., Chevalier, S., Grance, T., & Dang, H. (2006). Guide to integrating forensic techniques into
incident response. Retrieved from https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-86/final
Kessler, G. C., & Carlton, G. H. A study of forensic imaging in the absence of write-blockers. (2014).
The Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 9(3), 51-58.
Kissel, R., Scholl, M., Skolochenko, S., & Li, X. (2013). Guidelines for media sanitization. Retrieved
from https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-88r1.pdf
Kumar, K., Sofat, S., Jain, S. K., & Aggarwal N. (2012). Significance of hash value generation in digital
forensic: A case study. International Journal of Engineering Research and Development, 2(5), 6470.
Lyle, J. R. (2006). A strategy for testing hardware write block devices. Journal of Digital Investigations,
1(3), 3-9.
Mael, H. (2019). HxD- Freeware hex editor and disk editor. Retrieved from www.mh-nexus.de/en/hxd
Meffert, C. S., Baggili, I., & Breitinger, F. (2016). Deleting collected digital evidence by exploiting a
widely adopted hardware write-blocker. Journal of Digital Investigations, 7(18), S87-96.
Metz, J. (2019. New Technologies File System (NTFS). Retrieved from https://github.com/libyal/libfsntf
s/blob/master/documentation/New\%20Technologies\%20File\%20System\%20(NTFS).asciidoc
Mikhailov, D. (2019). NTFS file system. Retrieved fromhttp://itc.upt.al
Nelson, B., Phillips, A., & Steuart, C. (2013). Guide to Computer Forensics and Investigations (4th ed.).
Boston, MA: Cengage Learning.
Newsham, T., Palmer, C., Stamos, A., & Burns, J. (2007). Breaking forensics software: Weaknesses in
critical evidence collection. Retreived from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/da89/2ddca1a625bfac
3fe8f5b32447004db16eca.pdf
NTFS, Active@ Data recovery Software. Retrieved from http://www.ntfs.com
International Journal of Cybersecurity Intelligence and Cybercrime, Vol. 3, Iss. 1, Page. 24-41, Publication date: February 2020.

40

The Role of File-system in Modification of Hash Value

Raychaudhuri & Christopher, 2020

Oh, J. (2013). NTFS Log Tracker. Forensic Insight: Digital Forensics Community in Korea.
Parser for $LogFile on NTFS. Retrieved from https://devhub.io/link
Purcell, D., & Lang, S. (2008). Forensic artifacts of Microsoft windows vista system. In Yang C.C. et al.
(Ed.), Intelligence and Security Informatics. ISI 2008 (pp. 304-319). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg:
Springer.
Rusbarsky, K. L., & City, K. (2012). A forensic comparison of NTFS and FAT32 file systems. Retrieved
from https://www.marshall.edu/forensics/files/RusbarskyKelsey_Research-Paper-Summer-2012.
pdf
Russinovich, M., & Solomon, D. A. (2012). Ionescu A. Windows Internals – Part 1 (6th ed.). Redmond,
Washington: Microsoft Press.
Russinovich, M., & Solomon, D. A. (2012). Ionescu A. Windows Internals – Part 2 (6th ed.). Redmond,
Washington: Microsoft Press.
Schicht, J. (2014). NTFS File Extractor. Retrieved from https://github.com/jschicht/NtfsFileExtractor
Schicht, J. (2014). Mft2Csv. Retrieved from https://github.com/jschicht/Mft2Csv
Schicht, J. (2014). LogFileParser. Retrieved from https://github.com/jschicht/LogFileParser
Svensson, A. (2005). Computer forensic applied to windows NTFS computers. Stockholm’s University,
Royal Institute of Technology.
Roussev, V. (2009). Hashing and data fingerprinting in digital forensics. IIEEE Security and Privacy,
7(2), 49-55.
Vanstone, S., van Oorschot, P., & Menezes,A. (1997). Handbook of applied cryptography. Boca Raton,
FL: CRC Press.
Wee, C. K. (2006). Analysis of hidden data in NTFS file system. Retrieved from https://www.forensicfo
cus.com/downloads/ntfs-hidden-data-analysis.pdf

International Journal of Cybersecurity Intelligence and Cybercrime, Vol. 3, Iss. 1, Page. 24-41, Publication date: February 2020.

41

